Introduction
While the economic and legal discussions of central bank independence arguably peaked in the 1990's, often inspired by the creation of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and the European Central Bank (ECB) and the related institutional reforms in a number of European Union countries, the topic remains on the agenda, not only for academics. This may first of all be explained by the fact that many but certainly far from all countries have accepted and implemented the philosophy underlying central bank independence. Thus, in some instances preference continuous to go out to a more direct influence on monetary policy andat times -direct access to central bank money. Moreover, even if the ratio behind this basic institutional setup for central banks is recognized, the implications for the concrete legal arrangements remain subject of debates. This is in particular the case since the realization has set in more prominently that in a democratic society, central bank independence needs to be counterbalanced by mechanisms ensuring the accountability of the central bank for the performance of the tasks with which it is entrusted.
The economic ratio for central bank independence has been demonstrated extensively. From an economic point of view it has been argued that the depletion of the central bank's capital amounts to providing direct credit to the government, often resulting from government policies forced upon the central bank. 12 While it may be argued that central bank losses bearing upon the central bank capital may not in all instances be attributed to government, the lack of an obligation on parts of the latter to recapitalize the bank may make the pursuing of such policies attractive, as the central bank will in the first instance have to pick up the tab. What is more, the central bank may once more have to rely on the good will of the government to come to the rescue in case the initial capital proofs insufficient. The central bank may become economically dependent. For this reason the legal basis of a central bank should not only lay down in details the amount and arrangements concerning the paying up of any initial authorized capital, but should also specify the procedure applicable in case that a need for recapitalization arises.
It may be argued that the central bank's independent position is best served by including legal arrangements allowing for an automatic capital contribution upon the request by the central 9 The latter is however the case in the People' future. 17 The Governing Council can take this decision in order to sustain the adequacy of the capital base needed to support the operations of the European Central Bank.
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The legal basis of central bank may thus very well provide for a system whereby the democratically elected government decides on the margins within which it is for the central bank to decide on an actual increase in capital. The key to this arrangement is that at the time when the actual need for a re-capitalization arises, the bank is not depended from government.
Central bank budget
In order to ensure the financial independence of a central bank, the latter should not be depend on the government's general budget, but rather be in a position to finance its operations through generated income. Likewise, a central bank's annual plan including intended expenses and revenues should not be in control of government, as the latter opens the possibility of political influence on central bank operations.
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In what may arguably be described as the most severe arrangement from the point of view of central bank independence, the budget of the central bank forms an integral part of the annual government budget. Depending on the constitutional system and the applicable budget appropriation procedure this may first of all provide executive government and parliament with a superb instrument to achieve central bank compliance. Moreover, even if government manages to withstand the temptation, the central bank may find itself in an awkward position in case that the appropriation procedure comes to a standstill as a result of differences between executive government and parliament. An obvious solution to the latter problem is to uncouple the approval of the central bank budget from the general budget appropriation procedure. An example for such an arrangement can be found at the Bank of Japan, which prepares a budget 17 The Council of the European Union acts by a qualified majority either based on a recommendation from the ECB and after consulting the European Commission or acting unanimously on a proposal from the European Commission and after consulting the ECB. 18 The Governing Council can decide to increase the initial capital of euro 5000 million by euro 5000 million. From the point of view of accountability a complete freedom on parts of the bank to establish its budget or a mere obligation to submit an estimate of expenditures for information purpose is problematic. Indeed, such arrangements disregard the fact that central bank is essentially managing public funds. It may be argued that central bank financial accountability is ensured to the extent that modern central bank laws provide for an internal and/or external review of the bank's accounts. Yet, first of all, monetary policy operations are often explicitly or implicitly excluded from such audits. 24 Moreover, such audits can at best amount to an effective mechanism of ex post accountability, if and to the extent that the legal basis attaches consequences for the central bank in case that the central bank's managing of its finances is considered unacceptable. Central bank laws are regularly silent on this specific issue. As a consequence of the separation of the budgets of independent central banks from government budget, the former will also not be subjected to any existing parliamentary procedure on the discharging of government. Generally, a differentiation has to be made between rules governing the allocation of any existing profits and a provision included in the legal basis committing the central bank to a profit oriented conduct of its operations. The latter has to be considered problematic, as a profit oriented central bank may not at the same time be able to function as a guarantor of a stable monetary policy. The reason for this can be found in the positive correlation which has been observed between inflation on the one side and the income from seigniorage and the managing of obligatory reserve requirements on the other side. 30 To the extent that the legal basis of a central bank defines price stability as an objective, the introduction of profits as an additional and coequal goal may lead to a conflict of interests. Moreover, such an arrangement may de facto result in an unholy alliance between the central bank and government, as the latter can be considered as the main beneficiary of profits generated by the central bank.
The formulation of a profit goal is also not an indispensable element in judging the performance of the bank and hence, is not a necessary element of central bank accountability. Equally problematic is the situation where the profit calculation includes unrealized gains.
Taking account of such paper profits which increase or decrease over time or even transform into a loss amount to a misrepresentation of the bank's financial position. Consequently, the legal basis of a central bank should state unequivocally that unrealized gains are deducted from the profits, which become the basis of profit distribution. A notable example of how the issue of unrealized gains can be addressed in the legal basis can be found in the new statute of the Central Bank of Iraq. The bank is obliged to deduct from the net income the total amount 33 Cf. also for example Article 11 Bank of England Act 1998. 34 For more details cf. Sullivan (2002), with further references. 35 Article 53 (6) Bank of Japan Law.
of unrealized gains for a financial year on assets or liabilities that are recorded at fair value or are denominated in foreign currency. 36 Until such time that they are realized, an amount equivalent to such gains has to be allocated to an unrealized profits reserve. Gains are added to the net profits at the end of the financial year in which they have been realized.
In Council. 40 Given the fact that the central bank profits essentially constitute public funds, it should likewise not be at the discretion of the central bank itself to decide on the amounts of net profits withheld for the purpose of being added to the general reserve. A rule such as that to be found for the ESCB and ECB may provide a good solution in this regard. Here, the maximum amount to be allocated to the general reserve which itself is subject to a limit of 100 percent of the ECB's capital is curtailed, while at the same leaving it at the discretion of the central bank to decide on the actual amount within the given margins. 41 An interesting legal approach involving parliament can be found for the Swedish Riksbank. The Swedish parliament (Riksdag) does not only approve the bank's profit and loss account and balance sheet, but also determines the allocation of the Riksbank's profits, whereby parliament is obliged to allocate at least 10 percent of the net profits to the reserve fund in case that the latter has not reached its prescribed level.
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Next to the distribution of profits, the legal basis of a central bank needs to include rules on the distribution of losses. This is far from evident, as the lack of any extensive reference in some central bank laws highlights. 43 In principle different legal arrangements are conceivable as a comparison of different central bank law reveals. Firstly, the law may prescribe that any losses are made up by appropriation of government. 44 Where the central bank is at the same time required to distribute all net profits to government, such a legal arrangement may ensure a balance between profit and loss distributions. In many instances the legal basis requires that net looses are offset against the general reserve installed for that very purpose. 45 Whether this amounts to an asymmetric treatment of profit and losses, as seems to have been suggested in the literature, is questionable. 46 To the extent that the law requires the allocation of a certain percentage of net profits to a general reserve this effectively results in the diminution of the amount distributed to government. Government is thus effectively picking up the bill for as long as the central bank has a reserve to draw from. 
